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Abstract 
The aim of this dissertation was to assess the effectiveness of the social and ethics committee 
when carrying out its function specifically focused on the function to prevent and report 
corruption with its current formulation and accounting structures. An empirical component 
was explored in which different companies‟ social and ethics committee reports were 
investigated in order to assess the effectiveness of the committee. The sample reports were 
evaluated against guidelines published by the CIPC. Observations made from the study is that 
it is important for the committee to monitor and report on all six criteria contained in the 
published guidelines of the CIPC on their report, as the criteria are inter-linked with each 
other. 
The lack of independence and accounting structure of the committee threatens its 
effectiveness, it is for this reason why the legislator should consider codifying some of the 
principles recommended by the King Code. If the committee is to combat corruption and/or 
report any company activities that are not in line with the Act and regulation 43, especially 
bribery and corruption, it needs to function independently and needs to be allowed to report 
contravention of the Act and any corrupt activities to the regulator and police where 
necessary. The Public Finance Management Act, Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act, the King Code and the JSE listing requirements are useful supplementary 
mechanisms that the committee can utilise in their effort to reduce or prevent corruption in 
companies 
It is important to give the committee the right mandate and clear terms of reference to allow it 
to function independently and objectively, in order to effectively fulfil its function. It is also 
important to ensure that the committee works effectively given its role which is to protect the 
company‟s social responsibility and non-financial aspect of the business.   
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1. Introduction 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as amended by the 
Companies Amendment Act 3 of 2011 came into effect on 1 May 2011. One of the changes 
brought about by the Act is section 72(4) which provides for the establishment of the social 
and ethics committee. The purpose of this dissertation is to critically assess the function of 
the social and ethics committee in monitoring the company‟s activities in respect of 
corruption. 
There is no direct definition of corruption, the reason being that defining corruption is often 
found to be problematic and difficult.
1
 The Public Services Anti-Corruption Strategy listed 
some of these difficulties.
2
 The Public Services Anti-Corruption Strategy held the view that 
“Corruption appears in permutations and in degrees of intensity, varying from the occasional 
acceptance of bribes to systematic corruption where bribery is the accepted way of „doing 
business‟ and large-scale looting of a country's resources. Socio-economic conditions, the 
political-institutional infrastructure, cultural heritage and other factors influence the way in 
which corruption is perceived and addressed. Whilst corruption seems easily identifiable, the 
varying perspectives makes (sic) it particularly difficult to define corruption and develop 
appropriate remedies."
3
 
Although we do not have a direct definition of corruption, one can identify it either in an 
activity, transaction or behaviour. Corruption manifests itself in various ways, namely, 
bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, abuse of power, conflict of interest, insider trading 
or abuse of privileged information, favouritism and last but not least nepotism.
4
 Corruption 
Watch in their 2018 report, reviewed 2469 cases/reports, this included quarter 1 (1353) and 
quarter 2 (1116) 2018 figures.
5
 Out of the 2469 cases, trending forms of corruption and areas 
of concerns were identified to be corruption in schools (10,8%), corruption in offices of 
municipalities (9,2%), corruption in South African Police Services (6,3%) licencing centres 
(3,3%), state owned entities (3,1%) and the health sector (2,7%).
6
 The most common forms 
                                                          
1
 Department of Public Services and Administration “Public Services Anti-Corruption Strategy” 2002, p 10 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CPSI/UNPAN025768.pdf> (accessed on 01-07-
2019). 
2
 Department of Public Services and Administration (n 1) 8 - 9. 
3
 Department of Public Services and Administration (n 1) 8 - 9. 
4
 Department of Public Services and Administration (n 1) 7 - 8. 
5
 Corruption Watch Act Report 2018 Vol 2 Issue 2, p 1 <https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/Corruption-Watch-ACT-Report-2018-eBook-OUT-Agent-Orange-Design-
07082018.pdf.> (accessed on 01-07-2019). 
6
 Corruption Watch Act Report (n 5) p 8.  
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of corruption across these areas were bribery, irregularities in procurement, embezzlement of 
funds and theft of resources.
7
 A bulk of corruption cases within state owned companies 
related to irregularities in procurements, the report indicated 44% of these, while 20,3% 
related to bribery, 6,7% irregularities in employment and 29% was reported as other forms of 
corruption.
8
 Bribery and nepotism were some of the claims made in state owned companies 
when it comes to procurements of goods and/or services.
9
 Procurement in both private and 
public companies remains one of the areas in which corruption is the rifest.
10
 Corruption is 
one of the main causes of challenges that are associated with public sector procurement.
11
 
“Public sector procurement and corruption are like inseparable twins.”12  
Currently in South Africa, corruption is at the centre of the state capture commission chaired 
by Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo which was formed on the basis of the former public 
protector, Thuli Madonsela‟s recommendation when she published her report on state 
capture.
13
 The report drew attention to state owned companies‟ mismanagement of funds and 
irregular expenditure.
14
 The state capture commission is a judicial commission of inquiry 
looking into allegations of state capture, corruption and fraud in the public sector including 
organs of state.
15
 In addition to the state capture allegations, the Venda Building Society 
(VBS) made headlines after the release of a report compiled by Advocate Terry Motau SC 
assisted by Werkmans Attorneys, detailing how the bank was looted.
16
 Part of the 
recommendations made by the report was an auditor‟s liability claim to be instituted by the 
prudential authority, the curator and National Treasury against KPMG. The report further 
recommended the winding-up of VBS bank as there was no prospect to save it due to the 
corruption in persons in its employment in any position of authority who were in one way or 
                                                          
7
 Corruption Watch Act Report (n 5) p 9. 
8
 Corruption Watch Act Report (n 5) p 19. 
9
 Corruption Watch Act Report (n 5) p 18. 
10
 Munzhedzi PH “South African public sector procurement and corruption: Inseparable twins? “ 1999 Journal 
of Transport and Supply Chain Management ISSN: (Online) 2310-8789, p 1. 
11
 Munzhedzi PH (n 10) p 1. 
12
  Munzhedzi PH (n 10) p 1. 
13
 Public Protector “State of Capture Report” South Africa 2016/17 <http://saflii.org/images/329756472-State-
of-Capture.pdf> (accessed on 01-07-2019). 
14
 Public Protector (n 13) 4. 
15
 Republic of South Africa “Rules governing proceedings of the judicial commission of inquiry into allegations 
of state capture, corruption and fraud in the public sector including organ of state” 2018, p 1. 
<http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2018/20180713-gg41772_gen396-SCAPcomms-Rules.pdf> 
(accessed on 29-08-2019). 
16
 VBS mutual bank “The great bank heist, Investigators report to the Prudential Authority” 2018, p 1 
<https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/8830/VBS%20Mutual%20Bank
%20-%20The%20Great%20Bank%20Heist.pdf> (accessed on 01-07-2019). 
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another complicit.
17
 Other reported cases include the saga of Steinhoff (a JSE listed 
company) that lead to the loss of billions of rands of pension funds belonging to public 
servants and public members that were invested in the company
18
 and the irregular tenders 
granted to the African Global Group.
19
 Eskom, Transnet and South African Airways (SAA) 
have been used as vehicles to commit corruption through their procurements processes.
20
 The 
board of directors, the executive management and in some cases cabinet ministers have either 
been alleged to be drivers or enablers of corruption in these companies. Most of the 
companies referred to in the cases above are companies which are required by the Act to 
establish the social and ethics committee.  
The aim of this dissertation is to assess the effectiveness of the social and ethics committee 
when carrying out its function.  This will be done through a review of the powers granted to 
the committee by the Act as well as the challenges and limitations they face. Focus will be 
placed on the function of the social and ethics committee when monitoring corruption within 
company activities. Further, the dissertation contains an empirical component in that it will 
investigate different companies‟ social and ethics committee reports in order to assess the 
effectiveness of the committee.This assessment will be conducted through a desktop review 
of these reports. The methodology for the empirical component is explained further in 6 
below. In conclusion, recommendations will be made on the various ways the social and 
ethics committee can effectively monitor and to an extent prevent corruption within company 
activities.  
2. Problem Statement and Rationale 
The Act and the Companies Regulations, 2011
21
 (hereinafter referred to as the regulations) is 
clear on the functions of the committee. One of the functions of the committee is to monitor 
the activities of companies regarding matters relating to corruption.
22
  
                                                          
17
 VBS mutual bank (n 16) 138.  
18
 Timeslive “Pension funds lost billions over Steinhoff” 31-01-2018 <https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-
times/business/2018-01-31-pension-funds-lost-billions-over-steinhoff/> (accessed on 19-08-2019). 
19
 IOL News “Bosasa scandal: Inside the world of corruption, greed and irregular tenders” 10-02-2019 
<https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/news/bosasa-scandal-inside-the-world-of-corruption-greed-and-
irregular-tenders-19224598> (accessed on 29-08-2019). 
20
 Daily Maverick “Commissions of Inquiry - South Africa’s pursuit of nothing but the truth” 19-12-2019 
<https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-12-19-commissions-of-inquiry-south-africas-pursuit-of-
nothing-but-the-truth/> (accessed on 19-08-2019). 
21
 Reg 43. 
22
 Reg 43. 
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The 2018 Corruption Perception Index painted a gloomy picture for South Africa. The report 
highlights how democracy is under threat as long as corruption continues both in private and 
public sectors. The perception index uses a scale of 0 to a 100, where 0 is deemed to be 
highly corrupt and 100 is deemed to be very clean. South Africa scored a 43 on its perception 
levels of public sector corruption, placing it just below the middle when compared to 180 
other countries.
23
 The low score of 43 on South Africa‟s perception index highlights the 
work, implementation and effective monitoring tools each company needs to build in order 
for the committee to effectively fulfil its mandate in monitoring and reporting on corruption.  
In this dissertation I will assess how effective the social and ethics committee is when 
preventing and reporting corruption with its current formulation and its accounting structures. 
Furthermore the dissertation will assess the provision of section 72(5)(a) and (b), which 
provides an exemption where companies can apply to be exempted from establishing a social 
and ethics committee.  A sample of social and ethics committee reports will then be evaluated 
against guidelines published by the CIPC and some preliminary observations will be made on 
the correlation between compliance with the guidelines and instances of reported corruption. 
3. The powers and functions of the social and ethics committee 
3.1.1 Requirement to establish the social and ethics committee 
Section 72(4)(a) the Act provides that the Minister may prescribe a category of companies 
that must each have a social and ethics committee, if it is desirable in the public interest, 
having regard to their annual turnover, workforce size or the nature and extent of the 
activities of such companies. Regulation 43(1) states that the regulation applies to state 
owned companies, listed companies and any other company that has in any two of the 
previous five years, scored above 500 points. Despite the reference to turnover, workforce 
size, or the nature and extent of activities these aspects do not feature in the regulation at all. 
The regulation simply looks at the type of company that must establish the social and ethics 
committee. The omission could mean that the regulation are ultra vires as there are out of 
step with section 72(5) of the Act. 
                                                          
23
 Transparency International “Corruption Perceptions Index” 2018 
<https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/corruption_perceptions_index_2018> (accessed on 
01-07-2019). 
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3.1.2 Composition 
The Minister by regulation may prescribe the rules governing the composition and conduct of 
the social and ethics committee.
24
 The regulation prescribes that the social and ethics 
committee must comprise of not less than three directors or prescribed officers of the 
company, at least one of whom must be a director who is not involved in the day to day 
management of the company‟s business and must not have been so involved within the 
previous three financial years.
25
 The King Code recommends that the composition of the 
social and ethics committee should comply with regulatory requirement in terms of three 
directors, however it recommends additionally that the committee should consist of a 
majority of non-executive members.
26
 
3.1.3 Mandate of the social and ethics committee 
The functions to be performed by the social and ethics committee may also be prescribed by 
regulation.
27
 These functions, which also constitutes a mandate, are broad and based on 
regulation 43(5)(a)(i)-(v). Amongst others it includes the monitoring of the company‟s 
activities with regards to the 10 principles set out in the United Nations Global Compact 
Principles,
28
 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
recommendations regarding corruption,
29
 the Employment Equity Act (EEA)
30
 and the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBEEA).
31
  The other company activities 
that the social and ethics committee should monitor include good corporate citizenship 
amongst others,
32
 the environment, health and public safety including the impact of products 
and services offered by the company,
33
 consumer relationship,
34
 labour and employment 
including the company‟s standing in terms of the International Labour Organization Protocol 
and its contribution towards educational development of its employees.
35
 Although the focus 
on this dissertation is on corruption, the function of the social and ethics committee is broad 
                                                          
24
 S72(4)(c) of Act 71 of 2008. 
25
 Reg 43(4). 
26
 IoDSA King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2016 <www.iodsa.co.za/page/IngIVReport> 
(accessed on 01-07-2019). 
27
 S72(4)(b) of the Act. 
28
 Reg 43(5)(a)(i)(aa).  
29
 Reg 43(5)(a)(i)(bb). 
30
 Reg 43(5)(a)(i)(cc). 
31
 Reg 43(5)(a)(i)(dd). 
32
 Reg 43(5)(a)(ii). 
33
 Reg 43(5)(a)(iii). 
34
 Reg 43(5)(a)(iv). 
35
 Reg 43(5)(a)(v). 
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and overlaps with other committees.
36
 The issues brought about by the overlap are discussed 
further in this dissertation.
37
  The OECD recommendations regarding corruption,
38
 and the 10 
principles set out in the United Nations Global Compact Principles
39
 (specifically, Principle 
10) are discussed below with focus placed on reducing and preventing corruption within 
companies. 
3.1.4 The OECD recommendations 
The OECD good practice guidance on internal controls, ethics and compliance which was 
adopted on 18 February 2010, is a guidance tool that is intended to be adopted by companies 
including small and medium sized companies.
40
 The OECD good practice guidance provides 
Guidelines on establishing a programme to prevent and detect foreign bribery.
41
 This 
Guideline has since been adopted by the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission 
(CIPC) into the Company Guideline 1 of 2018 titled the Guidelines for corporate compliance 
programme.
42
 
The OECD good practice guidance for companies recommends that companies should 
implement an effective internal control, ethics and compliance programme that measures the 
prevention and detection of foreign bribery which can be done through management 
commitment, support as well as the company‟s commitment to abide by laws and seeking the 
same commitment from its partners.
43
  The company should seek to implement compliance 
and ethics policies, measures to observe such policies, properly documented risk based due 
diligence into recruitment and procurements, financial and accounting system, disciplinary 
procedure, confidential and protective reporting processes and periodic reviews into its 
compliance programme.
44
 It further recommends companies and  professional associations to 
share information on foreign bribery issues including access to such database, make training 
                                                          
36
 Botha MM “Evaluating the social and ethics committee: Is labour the missing link? (2)” 2017 THRHR 1 p 15. 
37
 Refer to section 5: “Challenges of the social and ethics committee” p 21. 
38
 Reg 43(5)(a)(i)(bb). 
39
 Reg 43(5)(a)(i)(aa).  
40
 OECD “Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance” 2010 OECD 
<https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44884389.pdf> (accessed on 01-07-2019). 
41
 OECD (n 40). 
42
 CIPC “Guideline for Corporate Compliance Programme” Guideline 1 of 2018, par 1 
<http://www.cipc.co.za/index.php/news/Guideline-corporate-compliance-programme/> (accessed on 01-07-
2019). 
43
 OECD (n 40) par A. 
44
 OECD (n 40) sub-par 5 – 12. 
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available on all compliance policies, advise on how due diligence should be carried out and 
advise and support on resisting extortion and solicitation.
45
  
3.1.5 The South African Guideline 1 of 2018 
The South African Guideline 1 of 2018 (hereafter referred to as the Guideline) is addressed to 
the social and ethics committee of all companies required by s72(4) and regulation 43(1) to 
establish such a committee.
46
 The Guideline seeks to comply with the OECD good practice 
guidance on internal controls, ethics and compliance, provides companies with guidelines for 
corporate compliance programme and states that the social and ethics committee should be 
able to identify and evaluate the corruption risk that can arise amongst employees or those 
acting on its behalf. The Guideline states that, measures should be put in place to reduce the 
risk of corruption.
47
 The Guideline recommends a best practice method which would be for 
the company to implement a corporate compliance programme.
48
 The compliance programme 
amongst others includes a requirement for top management commitment and involvement in 
implementing this Guideline.
49
 Senior managers should establish a culture that does not 
tolerate corruption.
50
 An independent compliance officer who needs to assist in the 
implementation and monitoring of this programme, should be appointed.
51
 It recommends 
clear and practical policies dealing with corruption to which all staff members and senior 
managers must have access and be trained on.
52
 An audit review must be conducted into the 
compliance with these policies and the entire compliance programme.
53
 Companies should 
know their customers and suppliers through a due diligence process.
54
 This will enable the 
identification of corruption in these relationships (if any).
55
 The Guideline encourages the 
establishment of a whistleblowing line, which should be independent and protected.
56
  
                                                          
45
 OECD (n 40) sub-par 5 – 12. 
46
 CIPC (n 42) par 1. 
47
 CIPC (n 42) par 5.  
48
 CIPC (n 42) par 7. 
49
 CIPC (n 42) par 7.1. 
50
 CIPC (n 42) par 7.1. 
51
 CIPC (n 42) par 7.1. 
52
 CIPC (n 42) par 7.2. 
53
 CIPC (n 42) par 7.4. 
54
 CIPC (n 42) par 7.5. 
55
 CIPC (n 42) par 7.5. 
56
 CIPC (n 42) par 7.4. 
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3.1.6 The UN Global Compact Principles 
The 10 UN Global Compact Principles are divided into 4 categories with each detailing the 
objective of each principle.
57
  The 4 categories are, human rights (principle 1 and 2), labour 
(principle 3, 4, 5 and 6), environment (principle 7, 8 and 9) and anti-corruption (principle 
10).
58
 As the focus of this dissertation is on the committee‟s function in monitoring 
corruption, principle 10 will be discussed. Principle 10 states that companies should work 
against corruption, this includes all forms of corruption, namely extortion and bribery 
amongst others. The principle is driven by the achievement of a clean business which is seen 
as a good business for its stakeholders.
59
 A stronger and effective anti-corruption 
environment sustains a good standard of ethics and good practice.
60
 Corruption is seen as a 
practice that destroys the integrity of a company and has negative impact for the society at 
large.
61
 Therefore fighting corruption in companies should be an imperative strategic business 
risk. Transparency should be maintained across all stakeholder relationships.
62
  
3.1.7 Powers of the social and ethics committee 
The powers of the social and ethics committee are provided for in section 72(8) of the Act. 
The committee is given powers to call any director, company prescribed officer or employee 
to provide it with any information or an explanation necessary for the committee to carry out 
its function, receive any notices or communications in respect of the general shareholder 
meetings, to attend and be heard at these meetings. Regulation 43(5)(b) allows the social and 
ethics committee to draw any matter within its mandate to the board‟s attention and through 
one of its members to present on such matters within its mandate at the general meeting. 
Regulation 43(5)(c) allows the social and ethics committee through one of its members to 
attend the annual general meeting in order to report to shareholders matters within its 
mandate. There is no provision in the Act or the regulation requiring formally for this report 
to be part of the annual financial statements of such a company. Locke recommends that it 
should form part of the director‟s report and be subjected to external assurance from company 
                                                          
57
 United Nations Global Compact “The ten principles of the UN Global Compact” 2010 United Nations 
<https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/missiojn/principles> (accessed on 01-07-2019). 
58
 United Nations Global Compact (n 57). 
59
 United Nations Global Compact (n 57). 
60
 United Nations Global Compact (n 57) Principle 10. 
61
 United Nations Global Compact (n 57) Principle 10. 
62
 United Nations Global Compact (n 57) Principle 10. 
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auditors.
63
 The committee plays a continuous supportive role to the board as it is required to 
draw matters within its mandate to their attention as and when required.
64
 
3.1.8 Conclusion 
The social and ethics committee must report matters to the board and shareholders,
65
 which in 
the case of state owned companies comprises of a single shareholder. Regulation 43(4) does 
not require the director appointed to be independent as well as non-executive, this means that 
the director could be a representative of the company‟s holding company or of a related 
person, or creditor or interested stakeholder and still meet the regulation 43(4) requirement of 
not being involved in day to day management.
66
 Therefore unlike members of the audit 
committee who must satisfy the requirements of being independent and non-executive, this is 
not strictly required by the Act for members of the social and ethics committee. Although 
Locke states that it could be because the social and ethics committee will be subjected to an 
independent assurance, similar to financial reporting,
67
 an issue that can be brought about the 
current composition of the social and ethics committee is the lack of independence.  
The lack of independence pertains not only to the requirements for membership of the 
committee but also the committee‟s accounting structure which might pose a threat to the 
effectiveness of the committee. The function of the social and ethics committee is similar to 
the function of the audit committee as both committees have the function of monitoring and 
reporting and should therefore be subjected to similar criteria of independence and distance.
68
 
Given the function of the committee, it should not be seen as a board committee but a 
separate organ of the company which must be appointed by the shareholders.
69
 The 
committee has a possible implied duty to develop the company‟s code of conduct and ethics 
related policies and to monitor the compliance with such policies.
70
 The crucial role of the 
social and ethics committee requires that it should be completely independent, properly 
resourced and supported by company management, the board and the shareholders.  
                                                          
63
 Locke “Enhanced Accountability” in Esser and Havenga (eds) Corporate Governance Annual Review (2012), p 
110. 
64
 Locke (n 63) 110. 
65
 Reg 43(5)(b)-(c). 
66
 Locke (n 63) 109. 
67
 Locke (n 63) 109. 
68
 Locke (n 63) 109. 
69
 Delport (ed) Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 72. 
70
 Locke (n 63) 107-118. 
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3.2 Other measures to reduce corruption in companies 
3.2.1 Legislation  
There are other statutes that can be utilised by the social and ethics committee directly or 
indirectly so, in the exercise of its power and fulfilment of its function to monitor and report 
corrupt activities. These statutes can be relied on by the social and ethics committee to either 
prevent or reduce corruption and where it has occurred report to the relevant authorities for 
necessary sanctions.  
In this regard, the Preventing and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act
71
 defines various 
offences that are regarded as corrupt activities and the imposed sanctions. The social and 
ethics committee can document this within a company policy and ensure training of company 
staff.  
3.2.2 The Public Finance Management Act 
The objective of the Public Finance Management Act (hereinafter referred to as the PFMA)
72
 
includes ensuring transparent, accountable and sound management of the revenue, 
expenditure as well as assets and liabilities in institutions to which it applies.
73
 
Mismanagement of funds, bribery and irregular expenditure are the general consequence of 
corruption and have been the cause for the downfall of state owned companies. The PFMA 
defines fruitless and wasteful expenditure as expenditure made in vain which could have been 
avoided had proper care been exercised. Irregular expenditure is defined as expenditure 
incurred in contravention of the PFMA, State Tender Board Act 86 of 1968 or any provincial 
legislation providing for procurements in that government.
74
 Overspending and unauthorised 
spending can also result in corruption. The social and ethics committee can rely on the PFMA 
to monitor and identify possible corruption. 
3.2.3 The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act
75
 provides examples of offences 
that can result in corruption. It states that persons are guilty of an offence of corruption when 
they directly or indirectly accept or agree to accept gratification from another for the benefit 
of themselves or another, in order to act or influence another to act in a manner that amounts 
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to improper conduct (illegal, dishonest, unauthorised, incomplete, biased, misuse or selling of 
information) in carrying out or performing their duty that arises out of the constitution, 
contract, legal or statutory obligation in a manner that amounts to abuse of such power and/or 
breach of trust and/or violation of such duty in order to achieve an unjustified result that 
amounts to improper inducement to do or not do anything.
76
 The definition of gratification as 
contained in section 1 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act is broad 
and includes monetary and non-monetary benefits, including rights or privilege and any 
valuable considerations or benefits of any kind or nature. The Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act further expressly defines offences in respect of corrupt activities 
relating to different people and their positions and activities. This includes public officials
77
 
and those in legislative positions.
78
 The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
further makes it an offence to fail to report corrupt activity or even the suspicion thereof.
79
 
3.2.4 King Code Principles  
The King Code
80
 though not legislation is also an important tool that the social and ethics 
committee can use to monitor the company‟s activity to prevent and/or reduce corruption. 
Although it is a voluntary code that prescribes principles to which companies must comply 
with, companies listed in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) have to comply with the 
code in accordance with the JSE Listing Requirements.
81
 The King Code seeks to expand the 
role of the social and ethics committee. The King Code sets out principles, rules and practices 
by which a governing board is supposed to ensure accountability, fairness and transparency in 
an organisation‟s relationship with its stakeholders, which includes, investors, shareholders, 
regulators, industry competitors and the public.
82
 The King Code notes the responsibility of 
the governing committees, which includes the social and ethics committee, is divided into 4 
categories. The social and ethics committee firstly steers and sets the strategy, secondly 
approves policy and planning, thirdly oversees and monitors implementation and execution 
by management and fourthly ensures accountability.
83
 The King Code recommends that 
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organisations that are not legally required to establish a social and ethics committee should 
nevertheless consider creating one or a similar structure that would achieve similar outcomes 
as such a committee.
84
  
3.2.5 Conclusion 
One of the main reasons identified for the rife corruption is the blatant non-compliance with 
policies and legislation in place to curb this behaviour.
85
 One of the ways in which 
government can effectively address this problem is by punishing the offenders who do not 
comply with policies and legislation.
86
 The JSE listing requirements requires each company 
to disclose compliance with the code in their annual reports.
87
 The PFMA, Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, the King Code and the JSE listing requirements are 
useful supplementary mechanisms that the social and ethics committee can utilise in their 
effort to reduce or prevent corruption in companies. There is also work to be done by the 
South African Police Services and National Prosecuting Authority, when it comes to 
investigating and holding companies accountable. South Africa in its accountability report 
stated that, since 2015, there has been a total of 7 prosecutions into corruption against legal 
persons and most of these were against government departments, namely, Project Department 
of Education-(Free State), Project African Paper, Project North Sea Jazz Festival, State of 
Capture - Estina Leg, Project Liviero, Project Chow, Department of Health – Free State- S v 
Bassie Leeuw and Others.
88
 The National Treasury through the office of the Auditor General 
has noted the low number of prosecutions into corruption as a challenge.
89
 According to the 
National Treasury, one of the key challenges faced by South Africa in the fight against 
corruption is the unacceptable low reporting rate within the private and public sectors.
90
 A 
few of the recommendations made by Transparency International in their 2018 report, that 
Willem suggests South Africa should implement are, a dedicated anti-corruption agency, 
improvement in our investigation and prosecution authorities, investigations that are free 
from political interference and improving internal compliance programmes including those 
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not listed on the JSE Limited.
91
 The role of the social and ethics committee is therefore 
imperative in improving the internal compliance programme, monitoring company activities 
and reporting on non-compliance with the country‟s law and international codes in order to 
minimise corruption in companies. 
4. Exemption from establishing the social and ethics committee 
4.1 Requirements for an exemption application 
A company that is required by the Act to appoint a social and ethics committee may apply for 
exemption to the Companies Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal).
92
 The Tribunal 
may exempt a company from establishing a social and ethics committee if (a) it is required by 
other legislation to have and does have a structure that performs similar functions as that of 
the social and ethics committee and (b) if it is not in the public interest having regard to its 
size and activities.
93
 The Tribunal is empowered by the Act and it must accordingly grant or 
refuse an exemption application within the boundaries of the relevant requirements as set out 
in section 72(5)(a) and (b) of the Act.
94
 De Lange observed how the Tribunal does not often 
strictly apply the facts to an application for exemption.
95
 Given the function of the social and 
ethics committee and their overall mandate, which is the promotion of good corporate 
governance and social responsibility, it is important for the Tribunal to give careful 
consideration and provide a proper application to the facts at hand when granting an 
exemption application, whether in terms of section 72(5)(a) or (b) or when confirming the 
application of regulation 43(2)(a). 
4.2 The subsidiary exemption: Regulation 43(2)(a) 
Regulation 43(2)(a) which allows a subsidiary to not establish a social and ethics committee 
if the holding company already has established the committee and such committee will 
perform the functions as required by the regulation on behalf of that subsidiary will not be 
discussed extensively under this section. This is because it has been accepted that regulation 
43(2) applies automatically and does not require an application to the Tribunal.
96
 The 
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Tribunal does not make a decision to exempt the subsidiary but rather provides confirmation 
of the automatic exemption.
97
 This is further supported by the absence of reference to 
regulation 43(2)(a) in section 72(6).
98
 The section which determines the timeframe in which 
the exemption application is valid for, only mentions an application in respect of section 
72(5).
99
 Therefore a subsidiary which does not have to establish a social and ethics committee 
due to the requirements and application of regulation 43(2)(a) will cease to exist when such a 
requirement can no longer be met namely, the committee no longer exists.
100
  
4.3 The alternative formal mechanism exemption: Section 72(5)(a) of the Act 
Section 72(5)(a) allows the Tribunal to grant an exemption application to a company that has 
shown that it has some form of formal mechanisms in place as required by other legislation to 
perform similar functions as those performed by the social and ethics committee as 
prescribed by the section and regulation. There are two things that must be proven in respect 
of section 72(5)(a),firstly, that there is a formal mechanism in place as required by other 
legislation and secondly that such mechanism in place is already performing the functions of 
the social and ethics committee.
101
  
The two requirements, although simple enough to understand, has led to interpretation 
problems regarding „formal mechanism that must exist in terms of other legislation.‟ De 
Lange states that there is no other legislation that requires companies to have a social and 
ethics committee or to perform similar function as the social and ethics committee, therefore 
if the intention of legislature is that formal mechanism should include other structures as 
provided for in the Act or risk committee provided by the King Code IV, the Act should be 
amended as such.
102
 The Act needs to clarify better the term „formal mechanisms as required 
by other legislation‟ whether this includes similar structures as provided by the Act and to 
some extent principles of the King Code or any other industry principles that might be 
adopted and embedded formally by the company as required by that industry regulator in 
which they operate. It could be that the Act had external companies regulated by other 
foreign legislation or future new or amendments to legislation in mind, which might have a 
formal mechanism in place that performs similar functions as those of the social and ethics 
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committee. If this is the case, this excludes formal mechanism put in place as per King Code 
requirements in which case might cause frustrations to companies who might see this as a 
duplication of work. It is important for the legislature to clarify „other legislation‟ whether it 
excludes other committees found in the Act itself. The Act should also be amended to be less 
strict on „other legislation‟ and should include recognised codes of best practice that are 
generally adopted by most companies, namely King Code principles. Perhaps a guideline can 
be published as an interim solution to provide clarity.  
4.4 The no public interest exemption: Section 72(5)(b) 
Section 72(5)(b) of the Act, allows the Tribunal to grant an exemption application where a 
company has shown that it is not reasonably necessary in the public interest to require such a 
company to establish a social and ethics committee, having regard to the nature and extent of 
the activities of that company. Whether it is reasonably necessary and in the public interest to 
establish the social and ethics committee, the function of the committee as provided for in 
regulation 43(5) will be considered.
103
 The number of employees, extent of third party 
liability, company turnover and beneficial interest are some of the activities that are 
considered in respect of an application in terms of section 72(5)(b).
104
 If the nature and extent 
of activities are significant, the company must establish a social and ethics committee.
105
 De 
Lange criticises the interpretation of activities for not including actual consideration of the 
daily operations being conducted by that company.
106
 In light of the social and ethics 
committee function, the goods and services being delivered by the company may need to be 
considered
107
  
Given the functions of the social and ethics committee and the importance of such functions 
in demonstrating good corporate governance and increasing investor confidence, establishing 
a social and ethics committee must be a requirement for most companies (with the exclusion 
of small enterprise businesses and/or small private companies ). As long as the existence of 
the said company has a role in the country‟s economy, engages with consumers and has a 
significant number of employees, it should consider establishing a social and ethics 
committee. Companies should operate as responsible corporate citizens for the promotion of 
social development and economic growth. Therefore the Tribunal should apply section 
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72(5)(b) more strictly and conservatively.  The potential role of the social and ethics 
committee in the realisation of human rights, ethical leadership and corporate social 
responsibility is such that a stricter approach and interpretation of section 72(5)(a) and (b) 
would better serve the purpose of the Act as provided for in section 7. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In the 2017/2018 Companies Tribunal Annual Report, an increase of 26% was reported 
compared to the previous financial year in the number of exemption applications. The 
increase was attributed to the expiry of the 5 year exemptions previously granted. The report 
further states that there is a low number of exemption applications in relation to the pool of 
companies that are required to establish the social and ethics committee.
108
 The 2017/18 
report states that 60% of the exemption applications made, were declined due to failure of 
meeting the exemption requirements as stated in section 72(5)(a) and (b).
109
 This signifies 
how the Tribunal recognises the importance of establishing the social and ethics committee 
and the detriment this has for the social development, consumer protection and the economy 
at large, should companies be exempted from this requirement. Therefore, in as much as the 
Tribunal is following a conservative approach, it still remains important for the Act when it is 
amended to address some of the shortcomings under the exemption provisions, in order to 
make it clearer on companies required to establish the social and ethics and those that can be 
exempted. The clarity in the requirements to establish the social and ethics committee and 
when companies will be exempted from such requirement, also has the potential of reducing 
the number of applications to the Tribunal. Companies will be clearer on whether or not they 
should establish the social and ethics committee or whether they qualify for an exemption. 
5. Challenges for the social and ethics committee 
5.1 Overlap of social and ethics committee functions with those of other committees 
One of the challenges faced by the committee is the duplication between its role and those of 
other committees. The matters and extent to which the committee must function is unclear, 
there is an overlap between it and other committees such as the remuneration and audit 
committee.
110
 The functions of the social and ethics committee may overlap with other 
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committees because of how wide it is and the wider the scope of the social and ethics 
committee the more unlikely that people would want to serve on it and the overlap has cost 
implications for the company where two committees are looking at the same matter and both 
require fees in fulfilment of their functions.
111
 Joubert mentions that the social and ethics 
requirements were not accepted at first by listed companies, not because they were against 
these requirements but because of the difficulty in implementation which was overlapping 
with other committees, therefore creating some ambiguity and corporate compliance 
fatigue.
112
 
The social and ethics committee is functioning concurrently with other committees and the 
Act is silent whether the social and ethics committee can be combined with other committees. 
In companies reviewed below under section 6 „Desktop study into companies social and 
ethics committee reports‟ some companies have combined the social and ethics committee 
with other existing committees.  Transnet
113
 has combined it with the remuneration 
committee while Tongaat Hulett
114
 has combined it with their risk, safety, health and 
environment committee. The Act does not expressly prevent this and there is no guidance 
issued by the CIPC on whether companies can combine the social and ethics committee with 
other existing committees. Companies that have opted to combine these committees should 
guard against the social and ethics committee becoming a mere spectator on issues directly 
affecting it.
115
 The company should plan accordingly on how they run the different 
committees and share information amongst these committees.
116
 The social and ethics 
function is wide and include monitoring activities relating to BBBEE, EEA, environmental, 
health and public safety matters.
117
 The function of the social and ethics committee needs to 
be limited to those matters with no prior established governance mechanism in place, matters 
where there is another prior established governance mechanism in place such as a bargaining 
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council which handles BBEEA and EEA matters, their power should be limited.
118
 It is noted 
that companies in an effort to comply with the Act whilst recognising the wide scope of the 
social and ethics committee, are trying to be efficient, hence they opt to combine the social 
and ethics committee with other existing committees with the same board members. This 
approach is favoured in order to cut cost and minimise duplication in effort. 
5.2 No clear guidance whether the social and ethics committee is a board or company 
committee 
There is no clear guidance on whether the social and ethics committee is a board or company 
committee. It is also unclear on who needs to appoint members of this committee.
119
 
Regulation 43(2) states that the company must appoint the social & ethics committee whereas 
Regulation 43(3) states that the board of the company must appoint members of the social & 
ethics committee. Unlike section 90(1) and (1A) of the Act which requires for shareholders to 
annually elect members of an audit committee, there is no corresponding requirement in the 
Act for shareholders to elect members of a social & ethics committee at each annual general 
meeting of the company.
120
 The composition of the board means that the legislature might 
have intended the social and ethics committee to be an operational one.
121
 Whether the 
committee is a board or company committee has some implications when it comes to the 
liability of the members of this committee.
122
 Accountability of members of the social and 
ethics committee is important to drive its effectiveness in carrying out its function, 
particularly as one of the issues facing the effectiveness of the committee is the sanctions 
imposed on the failure to establish one, which is noted as merely the intervention from the 
CIPC.
123
 The lack of tools to monitor the social and ethics committee to ensure that once it is 
established it fulfils its functions, prevents the committee from carrying out its mandate in an 
effective manner.
124
 It is therefore important for the Act to clarify this when it is amended, to 
ensure any ambiguity is removed and members are aware of their liability when they do not 
comply with the Act and more importantly to improve the effectiveness of the social and 
ethics committee when it carries out its function. 
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5.3 No clear terms of reference 
The committee has no clear guidance on what is expected of them.
125
 There are no terms of 
reference and the social and ethics committee can claim any fee or cost for the consultants 
hired to assist in fulfilling its function.
126
 It is therefore necessary to develop clear terms of 
reference for this committee.
127
 Failure to provide clear terms of reference for the social and 
ethics committee will not only affect the effectiveness of this committee but may cause 
tension within company management and its stakeholders and this can only paralyse the 
company.
128
  The responsibilities of the social and ethics committee as both a statutory 
committee established in terms of the Act as well as a board committee or company 
committee should be detailed in its terms of reference.
129
  Although Stoop warns on the 
legislature being too directive and dictating the company‟s terms of reference,130 it remains 
important for the legislature to establish some guidelines which companies can tailor to suit 
their business operating model when it comes to responsibilities and the manner in which the 
social and ethics committee should monitor and report on its function and the execution of its 
duty.  
5.4 No defined structure and content of report 
The social and ethics committee must through one of its members report to the annual general 
meeting on matters that fall within its mandate.
131
 The Act and regulation 43 are silent on the 
standard and manner in which the social and ethics committee should report at the annual 
general meetings on matters that fall within their mandate. Although the CIPC Guideline 1 of 
2018 is trying to close the gap, the legislator should consider amending the Act itself with 
standard of reporting on the function of the social and ethics committee and, as proposed by 
Botha, to extend its powers to approve certain matters,
132
 namely policies the company 
implements in line with international standard when it comes to corruption, the company‟s 
standing in matters concerning BBEEA, the company‟s contribution towards employee 
development and consumer protection measures amongst others. Alternatively, the current 
Guideline 1 of 2018 can be enhanced to include the manner in which the social and ethics 
committee needs to report. Defining a standard to meet on the report to shareholders will 
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most likely result in minimal to no filtering of information. The requirements set for the 
social and ethics committee should also set the minimum number of times the committee 
should meet. This will ensure effective monitoring of corruption in companies. It should be 
mandatory for the social and ethics committee to publish their report in a publicly accessible 
domain. The publication of reports is in line with the purpose of the social and ethics 
committee as its existence is derived from public interest and social development.  
5.5 Conclusion 
It is important to give the social and ethics committee the right mandate and clear terms of 
reference to allow it to function independently and objectively, in order to effectively fulfil its 
function. The operating model of 3 lines of defence as proposed by the Institute of Internal 
Auditors, can be adopted where a company separates its business operations from its 
monitoring and reporting functions that assist in ensuring good governance is embedded. This 
is done in order to achieve some objective and independent assessment from these 
functions.
133
 Business operations including human resource and finance are considered first 
line defence and therefore form part of business operations. Legal, compliance and risk are 
considered second line defence and therefore should be independent and continuously 
provide assessments on the state of compliance, from policy, legal and risk perspective to the 
executive management team and the board committee.
134
 The audit function is considered 
third line defence and provide assurance to the board on the state of compliance of the 
business.
135
 The last defence mechanism is the board which is considered overall accountable 
and ultimately the last protective barrier in business operations.
136
 The 3 lines of defence 
operating model can be utilised and the second line (being the Legal, Compliance and Risk 
Officer) and third line (internal or external auditors) can write reports directly to the social 
and ethics committee on the state of business operations regarding compliance with the 
different policies, codes, regulations and laws. 
In order to run an effective social & ethics committee, the above challenges should be 
addressed. The mandate and the terms of reference of the social and ethics committee should 
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be clear. Members of the committee which should be composed as per the King Code 
requirement, should include majority independent non-executive members and similar to the 
audit committee, be appointed at the annual general meeting. The criteria for monitoring and 
reporting to the board and the annual general meeting should be prescribed through the Act or 
alternatively by enhancing Guideline 1 of 2018. Addressing these challenges will improve the 
committee‟s effectiveness when carrying out its function, especially when monitoring and 
reporting on corruption. As proposed by Botha
137
 and Rassouw
138
 the committee should be 
given additional powers to approve certain matters and advise the shareholders on strategic 
direction of the company's social and ethics performance. 
6.  Desktop study into companies social and ethics committee reports 
6.1 Introduction  
An empirical study by way of a desktop review was done into the different social and ethics 
committee reports that are published annually by different companies on their websites. The 
purpose of the desktop study was to ascertain how the social and ethics committee discharged 
its function as prescribed by regulation 43(5). In order to achieve this Guideline 1 of 2018
139
 
was used as the benchmark as it is addressed to the social and ethics committee in companies 
that are expected to establish one as per section 72(4) of the Act and regulation 43(1).  It 
should be noted that for purposes of this study only the social and ethics committee report 
within the prescribed financial year end was considered and only the social and ethics 
committee report was reviewed and not the entire integrated report. Where the social and 
ethics committee was not separated from the integrated report, only the section pertaining to 
the activities and function of the social and ethics committee was reviewed. The purpose of 
looking only at the social and ethics committee report alone and not considering the entire 
integrated report was to assess whether the social and ethics committee report when read 
alone clearly discharges its duties as prescribed by regulation 43(5).  
6.2 Scope and methodology 
Sixteen companies were selected for the review of their social and ethics committee 
reporting. The sample includes reports purporting to be that of the social and ethics 
committee, with some of these reports explicitly named as the „social and ethics committee 
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annual report‟ for the company‟s financial year end. The selection criteria of the sixteen 
companies was both random and judgemental. The aim of the selection was to ensure a 
representation from each business sector and as such random companies from retail, state 
owned companies, insurance, pharmaceutical and financial sector were selected. The 
judgement criteria was ensuring that the random selection included company reports that 
have been on the news for allegations of corruption whether in the form of accounting 
irregularities (namely, Steinhoff
140
 and Tongaat Hulett
141
) or misuse of procurements 
processes (namely, Eskom, Transnet and the South African Airways
142
).  Reports reviewed 
were those published on company websites for the financial year that ended in 2018. The 
reports from the following companies were considered:  
1. Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited (JSE),143 
2. Absa Group Limited,144  
3. Steinhoff International Holdings,145  
4. Exxaro Resources Limited,146  
5. Truworths International Holding Company,147  
6. Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Limited,148  
7. Clicks Group Limited,149  
8. Investec Limited,150  
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9. Discovery Limited,151  
10.  African Rainbow Minerals Limited,152  
11.  Woolworths Limited,153  
12.  Vodacom Group Limited,154  
13.  Eskom Holdings SOC Limited,155  
14. Tongaat Hulett Sugar South Africa Limited156 and  
15.  Transnet SOC Limited.157  
16.  South African Airways SOC Limited was the exception where the latest available 
report was for the financial year that ended 31 March 2017.
158
  
The desktop assessment was done in line with Guideline 1 of 2018.
159
 As defined by the 
CIPC, a guideline means a document issued by a regulatory agency with respect to a matter 
within its authority, which sets out recommended procedures, standards or forms reflecting 
that regulatory agency‟s advice as to what constitutes best practice on a matter.160 The criteria 
for the assessment when reviewing these reports was to check the following:
161
 
1. That there is an independent compliance officer.  
2. There are policies in place dealing with corruption.  
3. Training has been provided to staff members on these policies.  
4. That there was an audit review that was conducted into the compliance with these 
policies and the entire compliance programme.  
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5. That there is supplier due diligence process in place.   
6. That there is an established whistleblowing line, which is independent and protected.  
6.3 Findings 
In order to be considered to meet Guideline 1 of 2018, a company had to meet at least four of 
the six criteria. Companies that scored less than 4 were considered to not meet Guideline 1 of 
2018. Out of the sixteen companies reviewed, seven followed Guideline 1 of 2018 which 
describes the best practice on social and ethics committee functions, when reporting, with 
some offering more comprehensive details than others. These are listed below together with 
an indication of how many of the 6 criteria were met: 
1. JSE Limited (4),  
2. Absa Group Limited (6),  
3. Discovery Limited (5),  
4. Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Limited (5),  
5. Investec Limited (5),  
6. African Rainbow Minerals Limited (4), and 
7. Vodacom Group Limited (5)   
The remaining companies fell short of meeting Guideline 1 of 2018, with some of these 
companies merely regurgitating the Act or Regulation‟ requirements within their report and at 
the end of the report, stating that they have complied, with no reference to tools, mechanisms 
and/or any evidence provided on how they have complied with regulation 43(5). These were: 
1. Steinhoff International Holdings (1),  
2. Clicks Group Limited (1),  
3. Woolworths Limited (2),  
4. South African Airways SOC Limited (0),  
5. Tongaat Hulett Sugar South Africa Limited (2),   
6. Transnet SOC Limited (which has combined this committee with the 
remuneration committee) (2),   
7. Truworths International Holding Company (3),  
8. Exxaro Resources Limited (3), and 
9. Eskom Holdings SOC Limited (which had no direct social and ethics committee 
report) (3).  
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The detailed criteria and findings pertaining to each company are contained below in this 
dissertation under Annexure A: „Detail findings of desktop study into companies‟ social and 
ethics committee reports‟. 
6.4 Observations 
Corruption has the effect of increasing company cost as it diverts resources from their proper 
use.
162
 Regulation 43 prescribes as part of the social and ethics committee function to monitor 
and report on corruption, therefore a company‟s record on corruption has a direct bearing on 
the social and ethics committee.
163
 It was for this purpose that the desktop study was done on 
the social and ethics committee to assess how the committee discharges this duty. Companies 
that have been in one form or another embroiled in corruption scandals were found not to 
fully comply with all six criteria and also fell short of meeting four out of the six criteria. 
Although not all companies that fell short of meeting the four out of the six criteria were 
embroiled in corruption allegations, it is noted that five out of the nine of these companies 
have made headlines in the media for some form of corruption.  Steinhoff company that was 
involved in a scandal that lead to loss of billions of rands of pension funds,
164
 Transnet and 
the South African Airways that have been used as vehicles to commit corruption
165
 failed to 
mention four out of the six criteria in their social and ethics committee report. Tongaat Hulett 
Sugar South Africa Limited company which also made headlines after a report released by 
the company which was authored by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) following a six-month 
investigation, revealed its senior executives initiated undesirable accounting practices which 
included overstating of profits made for years,
166
 failed to mention four out of the six criteria 
in their social and ethics committee report. Eskom Holdings SOC, also named as one of the 
state owned companies that have been used as vehicles to commit corruption,
167
 made 
mention of three of the six criteria. Although the company mentioned half of the criteria set, 
it is important to note that the report failed to mention an independent whistleblowing line 
and a supplier due diligence review process. Although policies aimed at reducing corruption 
were mentioned, there was no mention of staff members being trained on these. The criteria 
that Eskom failed to mention in their report confirm how it was possible to use the state 
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owned company as a vehicle of corruption by taking advantage of their weaknesses in their 
procurements process.  
It should also be noted that the presence of a whistleblowing line is not a guarantee that there 
will not be corruption in a company, there are other factors that are important to consider 
with a whistleblowing line. Factors that should be considered is whether the whistleblowing 
line is independent and management cannot influence or intimidate staff members who make 
use of this line. Another factor is the awareness of such a line by staff members, if staff 
members are not aware of this line and how it operates, they cannot make use of it. This can 
be evidenced in the training that a company provides to staff as well as its documented 
policies. Intimidation of staff members is the one factor that can drive staff members away 
from using the whistleblowing line. This is why it is important for the company to ensure 
independence of this line and guarantee non-interference from any of its managers and senior 
executives. The whistleblowing line should only provide the number of cases reported to it by 
staff members to the social and ethics committee and not company executives or 
management. This is why it is important to ensure the composition of the social and ethics 
committee comprises of majority of independent non-executive members. 
It is important for the social and ethics committee to monitor and report on all six criteria on 
their report, as the criteria are inter-linked with each other. Only one company
168
 made 
mention of all six criteria in their social and ethics report. Four companies
169
 scored five out 
of six. Three of them
170
 failed to mention the appointed compliance officer within their social 
and ethics report. This could be that it might have been mentioned elsewhere in their 
integrated report, however as it is a criterion mentioned in Guideline 1 of 2018, it is important 
for companies to mention the appointment of a compliance officer in their social and ethics 
report. The appointment of a compliance officer ensures there is independent monitoring and 
reporting of company compliance into the different legislation and policies and this 
individual can report back to the social and ethics committee. It is not sufficient to develop 
policies that reduce corruption, however. These policies need to be embedded in the company 
and embedment can be evidenced through training and awareness to staff members on such 
policies. Procurements has been identified as an inseparable twin to corruption,
171
 it is 
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therefore important to create strong supplier due diligence. As mentioned not only should a 
company establish a whistleblowing line, it should ensure the line is independent. Importantly 
is assurance into this programme by means of a regular audit review. Therefore all six criteria 
should always be mentioned in the social and ethics committee report. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The Act does not prescribe how the committee should report at the annual general meeting. It 
also does not set down specific criteria on how the report of the committee should be written, 
but a mere regurgitating of the Act and regulation requirements cannot be what the legislator 
intended for the committee. In review of these reports it can be noted that it would be useful 
for the CIPC to enhance the current Guideline 1 of 2008. The enhanced provisions should 
provide a standard template or at least minimum requirements that the committee should 
meet in order to discharge its functions. This is important as there are different standards and 
methods applied by different companies, with some looking more mature than others. It is not 
only important for companies to report, it is also as important how companies report, to 
ensure that no relevant information is excluded. It is therefore proposed that the current 
guideline should be enhanced to include minimum requirements that the social and ethics 
committee should meet in their report that is presented at the annual general meeting.  The 
minimum number of times the social and ethics committee should meet during a financial 
year should also be set in the guideline as again there are different number of times that were 
observed, with some committees meeting twice and others meeting as much as four times in 
one year. The correct report with sufficient information will assist shareholders to make 
informed decisions and assess the compliance status of the company with section 72(4) of the 
Act and regulation 43. The more the social and ethics committee drives company compliance 
with section 72 and regulation 43, the most likely corruption can be prevented or at least 
reduced. 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion and Recommendations 
It is important to ensure that the social and ethics committee works effectively given its role 
which is to protect the company‟s social responsibility and non-financial aspect of the 
33 
 
business.
172
 Setting out a mandate and clear terms of reference will assist with the overlap in 
function. If the social and ethics committee is to combat corruption and/or report any 
company activities that are not in line with the Act and regulation 43, especially bribery and 
corruption, the social and ethics committee needs to function independently and needs to be 
allowed to report contravention of the Act and any corrupt activities to the regulator and 
police where necessary. The composition of the social and ethics committee is an important 
aspect in achieving effectiveness and the legislator should consider codifying some of the 
principles recommended by the King Code. The social and ethics committee should consist of 
a two thirds majority that should be independent non-executive directors and additionally as 
the social and ethics committee needs to monitor activities in line with international codes, 
laws and regulations, the independent operating and reporting of the compliance and legal 
function in the company is important. These functions can be the eyes and ears of the social 
and ethics committee and can report back on how the company is complying with the 
different laws and international codes. 
In conclusion, the social and ethics committee reports should be published where the public 
can access the report as this is in line with the role, function and the objective in which this 
committee was set up, which is the caretaker of the corporate social responsibility and the 
representative of the public interest in corporations. It is therefore important to allow the 
same public access to these reports which will further support the importance of having a 
minimum standard of requirements or enhanced Guideline 1 of 2018 that includes such 
minimum standard that the committee‟s report must comply with. Setting out an independent 
regulatory office to review work done by the social and ethics committee and whether it is 
discharging it‟s duties in accordance with the Act and regulation might also assist in ensuring 
the social and ethics committee effectively monitors the company‟s activities and report 
accordingly in matters concerning corruption and this will in turn assist the company and 
country at large. 
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9. Annexure A: Desktop study into companies social and ethics committee reports:  
Detail findings 
Company Question Yes No Reference 
Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange Limited 
(4/6) 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
officer 
x  JSE Limited Social Value Report “Reporting on 
social value creation” 2018 p 25 
<http://ir.jse.co.za/static-files/1aeacff1-32e1-4aaa-
b4e0-9eb2cd54e9fa> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
x  JSE Limited Social Value Report “Reporting on 
social value creation” 2018 p 28 
<http://ir.jse.co.za/static-files/1aeacff1-32e1-4aaa-
b4e0-9eb2cd54e9fa> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
 x JSE Limited Social Value Report “Reporting on 
social value creation” 2018 
<http://ir.jse.co.za/static-files/1aeacff1-32e1-4aaa-
b4e0-9eb2cd54e9fa> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
programme 
x  JSE Limited Social Value Report “Reporting on 
social value creation” 2018 p 01 “Assurance over 
this report” <http://ir.jse.co.za/static-files/1aeacff1-
32e1-4aaa-b4e0-9eb2cd54e9fa> (accessed on 27-
05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
 x JSE Limited Social Value Report “Reporting on 
social value creation” 2018 
<http://ir.jse.co.za/static-files/1aeacff1-32e1-4aaa-
b4e0-9eb2cd54e9fa> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
x  JSE Limited Social Value Report “Reporting on 
social value creation” 2018 p 25 
<http://ir.jse.co.za/static-files/1aeacff1-32e1-4aaa-
b4e0-9eb2cd54e9fa> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
 
Absa Group Limited 
(6/6) 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
officer 
x  Absa Group Limited “Environmental, social and 
governance review” 2018 p 19 
<https://www.absa.africa/content/dam/africa/absaaf
rica/pdf/reports/2018/absa-group-2018-
environmental-social-and-governanc-report.pdf> 
(accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
x  Absa Group Limited “Environmental, social and 
governance review” 2018 p 16, 35 and 43 
<https://www.absa.africa/content/dam/africa/absa
africa/pdf/reports/2018/absa-group-2018-
environmental-social-and-governanc-report.pdf> 
(accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of x  Absa Group Limited “Environmental, social and 
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staff member training into these 
policies 
governance review” 2018 p 16 
<https://www.absa.africa/content/dam/africa/absa
africa/pdf/reports/2018/absa-group-2018-
environmental-social-and-governanc-report.pdf> 
(accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
programme 
x  Absa Group Limited “Environmental, social and 
governance review” 2018 p 1 and 32 
<https://www.absa.africa/content/dam/africa/absa
africa/pdf/reports/2018/absa-group-2018-
environmental-social-and-governanc-report.pdf> 
(accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
x  Absa Group Limited “Environmental, social and 
governance review” 2018 p 32 
<https://www.absa.africa/content/dam/africa/absa
africa/pdf/reports/2018/absa-group-2018-
environmental-social-and-governanc-report.pdf> 
(accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
x  Absa Group Limited “Environmental, social and 
governance review” 2018 p 16 - 17 
<https://www.absa.africa/content/dam/africa/absa
africa/pdf/reports/2018/absa-group-2018-
environmental-social-and-governanc-report.pdf> 
(accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Steinhoff 
International 
Holdings (1/6) 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
officer 
 x Steinhoff International Holdings N.V “Regulations 
of the governance, social and ethics committee” 
2018 
<http://www.steinhoffinternational.com/downloads/
2018/GSE%20Committee%20Regulations.pdf> 
(accessed on 27-05-2019). 
 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
x  Steinhoff International Holdings N.V “Corporate 
Responsibility” 2014 
<http://www.steinhoffinternational.com/corporate-
responsibility/04-strategic-approach.php> (accessed 
25-09-2019). 
 
Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
 x Steinhoff International Holdings N.V “Regulations 
of the governance, social and ethics committee” 
2018 
<http://www.steinhoffinternational.com/downloads/
2018/GSE%20Committee%20Regulations.pdf> 
(accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
 x Steinhoff International Holdings N.V “Regulations 
of the governance, social and ethics committee” 
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programme 2018 
<http://www.steinhoffinternational.com/downloads/
2018/GSE%20Committee%20Regulations.pdf> 
(accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
 x Steinhoff International Holdings N.V “Regulations 
of the governance, social and ethics committee” 
2018 p xx 
<http://www.steinhoffinternational.com/downloads/
2018/GSE%20Committee%20Regulations.pdf> 
(accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
 x Steinhoff International Holdings N.V “Regulations 
of the governance, social and ethics committee” 
2018 p xx 
<http://www.steinhoffinternational.com/downloads/
2018/GSE%20Committee%20Regulations.pdf> 
(accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Exxaro Resources  
Limited (3/6) 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
officer 
 x Exxaro Resources Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report” 2018 
<https://www.exxaro.com/investor/integrated-
reports2018/social-and-ethics-committee-
report.php> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
x  Exxaro Resources Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report” 2018 
<https://www.exxaro.com/investor/integrated-
reports2018/social-and-ethics-committee-
report.php> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
 
Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
x  Exxaro Resources Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report” 2018 
<https://www.exxaro.com/investor/integrated-
reports2018/social-and-ethics-committee-
report.php> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
programme 
 x Exxaro Resources Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report” 2018 
<https://www.exxaro.com/investor/integrated-
reports2018/social-and-ethics-committee-
report.php> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
 x Exxaro Resources Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report” 2018 
<https://www.exxaro.com/investor/integrated-
reports2018/social-and-ethics-committee-
report.php> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
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Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
x  Exxaro Resources Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report” 2018 
<https://www.exxaro.com/investor/integrated-
reports2018/social-and-ethics-committee-
report.php> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
 
Truworths 
International 
Holding Company 
(3/6) 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
officer 
 x Truworths International Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report” 2018 
<https://www.truworthsinternational.com/annualrep
ort2018/assets/pdfs/online_reports/Social_and_Ethi
cs_Committee_Report_2018.pdf> (accessed on 27-
05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
x  Truworths International Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report” 2018 p 2 
<https://www.truworthsinternational.com/annualrep
ort2018/assets/pdfs/online_reports/Social_and_Ethi
cs_Committee_Report_2018.pdf> (accessed on 27-
05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
 x Truworths International Limited “Social and 
ethics committee report” 2018 
<https://www.truworthsinternational.com/annualr
eport2018/assets/pdfs/online_reports/Social_and_
Ethics_Committee_Report_2018.pdf> (accessed 
on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
programme 
 x Truworths International Limited “Social and 
ethics committee report” 2018 
<https://www.truworthsinternational.com/annualr
eport2018/assets/pdfs/online_reports/Social_and_
Ethics_Committee_Report_2018.pdf> (accessed 
on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
x  Truworths International Limited “Social and 
ethics committee report” 2018 p 2 
<https://www.truworthsinternational.com/annualr
eport2018/assets/pdfs/online_reports/Social_and_
Ethics_Committee_Report_2018.pdf> (accessed 
on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
x  Truworths International Limited “Social and 
ethics committee report” 2018 p 2 
<https://www.truworthsinternational.com/annualr
eport2018/assets/pdfs/online_reports/Social_and_
Ethics_Committee_Report_2018.pdf> (accessed 
on 27-05-2019). 
Aspen Pharmacare 
Holdings Limited 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
 x Aspen Holdings “Social and ethics committee 
report” 2018 <1https://www.aspenpharma.com/wp-
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(5/6)   officer content/uploads/2018/10/Aspen-2018-Social-
Ethics-Committee-Report.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-
2019). 
Report mentions Ethics Officers. 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
x  Aspen Holdings “Social and ethics committee 
report” 2018 p 2 – 3 
<1https://www.aspenpharma.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Aspen-2018-Social-
Ethics-Committee-Report.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-
2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
x  Aspen Holdings “Social and ethics committee 
report” 2018 p 2 
<1https://www.aspenpharma.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Aspen-2018-Social-
Ethics-Committee-Report.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-
2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
programme 
x  Aspen Holdings “Social and ethics committee 
report” 2018 p 3 
<1https://www.aspenpharma.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Aspen-2018-Social-
Ethics-Committee-Report.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-
2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
x  Aspen Holdings “Social and ethics committee 
report” 2018 p 4 
<1https://www.aspenpharma.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Aspen-2018-Social-
Ethics-Committee-Report.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-
2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
x  Aspen Holdings “Social and ethics committee 
report” 2018 p 3 
<1https://www.aspenpharma.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Aspen-2018-Social-
Ethics-Committee-Report.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-
2019). 
Clicks Group 
Limited (1/6) 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
officer 
x  Clicks Group Limited “Social and ethics committee 
report” 2018 p 1 
<https://www.clicksgroup.co.za/IRDownloads/Inte
gratedAnnualReport2018/Clicks_Social_and_Ethic
s_2018_online.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
 x Clicks Group Limited “Social and ethics committee 
report” 2018 
<https://www.clicksgroup.co.za/IRDownloads/Inte
gratedAnnualReport2018/Clicks_Social_and_Ethic
s_2018_online.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
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Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
 x Clicks Group Limited “Social and ethics committee 
report” 2018 
<https://www.clicksgroup.co.za/IRDownloads/Inte
gratedAnnualReport2018/Clicks_Social_and_Ethic
s_2018_online.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
programme 
 x Clicks Group Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report” 2018 
<https://www.clicksgroup.co.za/IRDownloads/Int
egratedAnnualReport2018/Clicks_Social_and_Et
hics_2018_online.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Report mentions a self-evaluation process on 
page 1.  
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
 x Clicks Group Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report” 2018 
<https://www.clicksgroup.co.za/IRDownloads/Int
egratedAnnualReport2018/Clicks_Social_and_Et
hics_2018_online.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
 x Clicks Group Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report” 2018 
<https://www.clicksgroup.co.za/IRDownloads/Int
egratedAnnualReport2018/Clicks_Social_and_Et
hics_2018_online.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Investec Limited 
(5/6)   
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
officer 
 x Investec Limited “Corporate Responsibility” 2018 
<https://www.investec.com/content/dam/south-
africa/welcome-to-investec/corporate-
responsibility/sustainability_reports_statements/Inv
estec-corporate-responsibility-report-2018-
FINAL.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
x  Investec Limited “Corporate Responsibility” 
2018 p 54 & 73 
<https://www.investec.com/content/dam/south-
africa/welcome-to-investec/corporate-
responsibility/sustainability_reports_statements/I
nvestec-corporate-responsibility-report-2018-
FINAL.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
x  Investec Limited “Corporate Responsibility” 
2018 p 54 
<https://www.investec.com/content/dam/south-
africa/welcome-to-investec/corporate-
responsibility/sustainability_reports_statements/I
nvestec-corporate-responsibility-report-2018-
FINAL.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
x  Investec Limited “Corporate Responsibility” 
2018 p 59 - 60 
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programme <https://www.investec.com/content/dam/south-
africa/welcome-to-investec/corporate-
responsibility/sustainability_reports_statements/I
nvestec-corporate-responsibility-report-2018-
FINAL.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
x  Investec Limited “Corporate Responsibility” 
2018 p 57 
<https://www.investec.com/content/dam/south-
africa/welcome-to-investec/corporate-
responsibility/sustainability_reports_statements/I
nvestec-corporate-responsibility-report-2018-
FINAL.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
x  Investec Limited “Corporate Responsibility” 
2018 p 16 & 54 
<https://www.investec.com/content/dam/south-
africa/welcome-to-investec/corporate-
responsibility/sustainability_reports_statements/I
nvestec-corporate-responsibility-report-2018-
FINAL.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Discovery Limited 
(5/6) 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
officer 
x  Discovery Limited “Integrated annual report” 2018, 
p 20 
<https://www.discovery.co.za/assets/discoverycoza
/corporate/investor-relations/integrated-annual-
report-2018.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
x  Discovery Limited “Integrated annual report” 2018, 
p 23 
<https://www.discovery.co.za/assets/discoverycoza
/corporate/investor-relations/integrated-annual-
report-2018.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
x  Discovery Limited “Integrated annual report” 
2018, p 21 
<https://www.discovery.co.za/assets/discoveryco
za/corporate/investor-relations/integrated-annual-
report-2018.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
programme 
x  Discovery Limited “Integrated annual report” 
2018, p 21 
<https://www.discovery.co.za/assets/discoveryco
za/corporate/investor-relations/integrated-annual-
report-2018.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
 x Discovery Limited “Integrated annual report” 
2018 
<https://www.discovery.co.za/assets/discoveryco
za/corporate/investor-relations/integrated-annual-
report-2018.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
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Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
x  Discovery Limited “Integrated annual report” 
2018, p 23 
<https://www.discovery.co.za/assets/discoveryco
za/corporate/investor-relations/integrated-annual-
report-2018.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
African Rainbow 
Minerals Limited 
(4/6)    
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
officer 
x  African Rainbow Minerals Limited “Corporate 
Governance Report” 2018 p 18 
<https://www.arm.co.za/im/files/annual/2018/ARM
_CGR2018.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
x  African Rainbow Minerals Limited “Corporate 
Governance Report” 2018 p 63 
<https://www.arm.co.za/im/files/annual/2018/AR
M_CGR2018.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
x  African Rainbow Minerals Limited “Corporate 
Governance Report” 2018 p 63 
<https://www.arm.co.za/im/files/annual/2018/AR
M_CGR2018.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
programme 
x  African Rainbow Minerals Limited “Corporate 
Governance Report” 2018 p 64 
<https://www.arm.co.za/im/files/annual/2018/AR
M_CGR2018.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
 x African Rainbow Minerals Limited “Corporate 
Governance Report” 2018 
<https://www.arm.co.za/im/files/annual/2018/AR
M_CGR2018.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
 x African Rainbow Minerals Limited “Corporate 
Governance Report” 2018 
<https://www.arm.co.za/im/files/annual/2018/AR
M_CGR2018.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Woolworths Limited 
(2/6) 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
officer 
 x Woolworths Holdings Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report: As extracted from the 2018 
Integrated Annual Report” 2018 
<https://www.woolworthsholdings.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/WHL_2018_Social_and_
Ethics_Committee_Report.pdf> (accessed on 27-
05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
x  Woolworths Holdings Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report: As extracted from the 2018 
Integrated Annual Report” 2018 p 132 
<https://www.woolworthsholdings.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/WHL_2018_Social_and
_Ethics_Committee_Report.pdf> (accessed on 
27-05-2019). 
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Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
 x Woolworths Holdings Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report: As extracted from the 2018 
Integrated Annual Report” 2018 
<https://www.woolworthsholdings.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/WHL_2018_Social_and
_Ethics_Committee_Report.pdf> (accessed on 
27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
programme 
 x Woolworths Holdings Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report: As extracted from the 2018 
Integrated Annual Report” 2018 
<https://www.woolworthsholdings.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/WHL_2018_Social_and
_Ethics_Committee_Report.pdf> (accessed on 
27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
 x Woolworths Holdings Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report: As extracted from the 2018 
Integrated Annual Report” 2018 
<https://www.woolworthsholdings.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/WHL_2018_Social_and
_Ethics_Committee_Report.pdf> (accessed on 
27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
x  Woolworths Holdings Limited “Social and ethics 
committee report: As extracted from the 2018 
Integrated Annual Report” 2018 p 137 
<https://www.woolworthsholdings.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/WHL_2018_Social_and
_Ethics_Committee_Report.pdf> (accessed on 
27-05-2019). 
Vodacom Group 
Limited (5/6)   
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
officer 
 x Vodacom Group Limited “Report of the social and 
ethics committee” 2018 p 27 
<http://www.vodacom-reports.co.za/integrated-
reports/ir-2018/pdf/social-and-ethics-report-
low.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Report mentions a compliance function but not 
whether an independent compliance officer has 
been appointed. 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
x  Vodacom Group Limited “Report of the social 
and ethics committee” 2018 p 26 
<http://www.vodacom-reports.co.za/integrated-
reports/ir-2018/pdf/social-and-ethics-report-
low.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
x  Vodacom Group Limited “Report of the social 
and ethics committee” 2018 p 26 
<http://www.vodacom-reports.co.za/integrated-
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reports/ir-2018/pdf/social-and-ethics-report-
low.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
programme 
x  Vodacom Group Limited “Report of the social 
and ethics committee” 2018 p 46 - 48 
<http://www.vodacom-reports.co.za/integrated-
reports/ir-2018/pdf/social-and-ethics-report-
low.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
x  Vodacom Group Limited “Report of the social 
and ethics committee” 2018 p 28 
<http://www.vodacom-reports.co.za/integrated-
reports/ir-2018/pdf/social-and-ethics-report-
low.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
x  Vodacom Group Limited “Report of the social 
and ethics committee” 2018 p 27 
<http://www.vodacom-reports.co.za/integrated-
reports/ir-2018/pdf/social-and-ethics-report-
low.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Eskom Holdings 
SOC Limited (3/6)    
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
officer 
x  Eskom Holdings SOC Limited “Integrated report” 
2018 p 16 - 17 
<http://www.eskom.co.za/IR2018/Documents/Esko
m2018IntegratedReport.pdf> (accessed on 27-05-
2019). 
Report mentions Ethics office. 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
x  Eskom Holdings SOC Limited “Integrated 
report” 2018 p 16 - 17 
<http://www.eskom.co.za/IR2018/Documents/Es
kom2018IntegratedReport.pdf> (accessed on 27-
05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
 x Eskom Holdings SOC Limited “Integrated 
report” 2018 
<http://www.eskom.co.za/IR2018/Documents/Es
kom2018IntegratedReport.pdf> (accessed on 27-
05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
programme 
x  Eskom Holdings SOC Limited “Integrated 
report” 2018 p 45 
<http://www.eskom.co.za/IR2018/Documents/Es
kom2018IntegratedReport.pdf> (accessed on 27-
05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
 x Eskom Holdings SOC Limited “Integrated 
report” 2018 p 17 – 18 
<http://www.eskom.co.za/IR2018/Documents/Es
kom2018IntegratedReport.pdf> (accessed on 27-
05-2019). 
Report mentions supplier review process that 
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audit and risk committee oversees.  
Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
 x Eskom Holdings SOC Limited “Integrated 
report” 2018 
<http://www.eskom.co.za/IR2018/Documents/Es
kom2018IntegratedReport.pdf> (accessed on 27-
05-2019). 
Tongaat Hulett 
Sugar South Africa 
Limited (2/6)     
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
officer 
 x Tongaat Hulett Sugar South Africa Limited “Risk, 
safety, health, environment (SHE), social and ethics 
committee” 2018 p 72 - 73 
<http://www.tongaat.com/annual_reports/ar_2018/c
orporate/risk.html> (accessed on 29-08-2019). 
Report mentions the Audit and Compliance 
Committee. 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
x  Tongaat Hulett Sugar South Africa Limited 
“Risk, safety, health, environment (SHE), social 
and ethics committee” 2018 p 72 - 73 
<http://www.tongaat.com/annual_reports/ar_2018
/corporate/risk.html> (accessed on 29-08-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
 x Tongaat Hulett Sugar South Africa Limited 
“Risk, safety, health, environment (SHE), social 
and ethics committee” 2018 p 72 - 73 
<http://www.tongaat.com/annual_reports/ar_2018
/corporate/risk.html> (accessed on 29-08-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
programme 
 x Tongaat Hulett Sugar South Africa Limited 
“Risk, safety, health, environment (SHE), social 
and ethics committee” 2018 p 70 
<http://www.tongaat.com/annual_reports/ar_2018
/corporate/risk.html> (accessed on 29-08-2019). 
Report mentions a self-review conducted. 
External review still to be conducted.  
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
 x Tongaat Hulett Sugar South Africa Limited 
“Risk, safety, health, environment (SHE), social 
and ethics committee” 2018 p73 
<http://www.tongaat.com/annual_reports/ar_2018
/corporate/risk.html> (accessed on 29-08-2019). 
Report mentions suppliers complying with the 
code of business conduct and ethics. 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
x  Tongaat Hulett Sugar South Africa Limited 
“Risk, safety, health, environment (SHE), social 
and ethics committee” 2018 p 72 – 73 
<http://www.tongaat.com/annual_reports/ar_2018
/corporate/risk.html> (accessed on 29-08-2019). 
Transnet SOC 
Limited (2/6) 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
 x Transnet SOC Limited “Sustainability outcome 
report” 2018 
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officer <https://www.transnet.net/InvestorRelations/AR20
18/Transnet%20SOR%202018.pdf> (accessed on 
27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
 x Transnet SOC Limited “Sustainability outcome 
report” 2018 
<https://www.transnet.net/InvestorRelations/AR2
018/Transnet%20SOR%202018.pdf> (accessed 
on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
 x Transnet SOC Limited “Sustainability outcome 
report” 2018 
<https://www.transnet.net/InvestorRelations/AR2
018/Transnet%20SOR%202018.pdf> (accessed 
on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
programme 
x  Transnet SOC Limited “Sustainability outcome 
report” 2018 p 82 - 83 
<https://www.transnet.net/InvestorRelations/AR2
018/Transnet%20SOR%202018.pdf> (accessed 
on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
 x Transnet SOC Limited “Sustainability outcome 
report” 2018 p 26 - 27 
<https://www.transnet.net/InvestorRelations/AR2
018/Transnet%20SOR%202018.pdf> (accessed 
on 27-05-2019). 
Report mentions integrity packs completed with 
each supplier. “Each party agrees to avoid all 
forms of dishonesty, fraud and corruption, 
including practices that are anti-competitive in 
nature, negotiations made in bad faith and 
underpricing.” 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
x  Transnet SOC Limited “Sustainability outcome 
report” 2018 p 26 - 27 
<https://www.transnet.net/InvestorRelations/AR2
018/Transnet%20SOR%202018.pdf> (accessed 
on 27-05-2019). 
South African 
Airways SOC 
Limited (0/6) 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent compliance 
officer 
 x South African Airways SOC Limited “Integrated 
report” 2017 p 85 
<https://www.flysaa.com/documents/51855150/0/S
AA_IAR+2017.pdf/22db54be-b1f5-404a-99fd-
d12f3fe9e56b> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
policies aimed at reducing and/or 
preventing corruption 
 x South African Airways SOC Limited “Integrated 
report” 2017 p 85 
<https://www.flysaa.com/documents/51855150/0/
SAA_IAR+2017.pdf/22db54be-b1f5-404a-99fd-
d12f3fe9e56b> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
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Does the report make mention of 
staff member training into these 
policies 
 x South African Airways SOC Limited “Integrated 
report” 2017 p 85 
<https://www.flysaa.com/documents/51855150/0/
SAA_IAR+2017.pdf/22db54be-b1f5-404a-99fd-
d12f3fe9e56b> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
audit review into compliance 
programme 
 x South African Airways SOC Limited “Integrated 
report” 2017 p 85 
<https://www.flysaa.com/documents/51855150/0/
SAA_IAR+2017.pdf/22db54be-b1f5-404a-99fd-
d12f3fe9e56b> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
a supplier due diligence process in 
place 
 x South African Airways SOC Limited “Integrated 
report” 2017 p 85 
<https://www.flysaa.com/documents/51855150/0/
SAA_IAR+2017.pdf/22db54be-b1f5-404a-99fd-
d12f3fe9e56b> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
Does the report make mention of 
an independent protected 
whistleblowing channel (whether 
email or telephone line) 
 x South African Airways SOC Limited “Integrated 
report” 2017 p 85 
<https://www.flysaa.com/documents/51855150/0/
SAA_IAR+2017.pdf/22db54be-b1f5-404a-99fd-
d12f3fe9e56b> (accessed on 27-05-2019). 
 
 
*It should be noted that for purposes of this study only the social and ethics committee report was reviewed and not the entire integrated 
report. Where the social and ethics committee was not separated from the integration report, only the section pertaining to the activities 
and function of the social and ethics committee were reviewed. Only the report within the prescribed financial year end. 
